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I
INTRODUCTION
Handicapped students are becoming integrated into the mainstream of
public education as hundreds of thousands of exceptional children are now
served in public schools at public expense' following the enactment of Public
Law No. 94-142, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 19752
(EAHCA or Act) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.3 Enor-
mous gains have been made toward achieving full educational opportunities
for handicapped children. Now that the legislation appears to be successful in
meeting its broad goals of providing access to an adequate public education
for handicapped children, however, parents, school systems, and ultimately
courts are grappling with many questions regarding specific placement deci-
sions within the public school system-a particularly difficult task because the
legislation gives little guidance regarding substantive requirements for the
educational programs of handicapped children.4
One of these difficult questions will be addressed in this comment: should
school districts be required to place children in an educational setting where
they will have an opportunity to interact with chronological age peers, even if
they are functioning academically at a different level? This question is not
directly addressed by either of these statutes or their accompanying regula-
tions, and few reported cases have even considered the question in making a
placement decision-much less made it the determining factor. The issue,
however, was recently litigated in the Durham (North Carolina) County
School System when parents of an 18-year-old mentally retarded student chal-
lenged the placement of their son in a self-contained classroom for mentally
handicapped students located in a junior high school because it was not "age
appropriate." Instead, the parents requested the same academic program-a
self-contained classroom for academic instruction with mainstreaming for
physical education and extracurricular activities-but located at the high
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school where the mainstreaming would be carried out with his chronological
age peers. Although the parents lost on this issue at the due process hearing,
and this decision was subsequently affirmed at the state hearing review level
and in state court, the parties were not allowed to develop this issue fully at
the first hearing. 5 Full development of the legal issues shows that considera-
tion of chronological age appropriateness may be required as a factor in
placement decisions for some children.
This comment will first describe the North Carolina case as an illustration
of the issue of age-appropriate placement and then explore ways in which the
two statutes and accompanying regulations may require consideration and
implementation of chronological age-appropriate educational placement.
Second, it will develop the idea that education includes nonacademic ben-
efits such as the development of social skills. Thus, age appropriateness
should be considered in every placement decision as a method of providing
socialization skills and may be required in cases where the child's individual
program shows that he can function in and gain benefit from an age-appro-
priate environment. The comment will then show that the integration prin-
ciple expressed by the least restrictive environment mandate also requires
age-appropriate placement unless the handicapping condition requires
removal from such a regular educational environment. Furthermore, it will
assert that such a requirement does not infringe upon local autonomy in the
field of public education as states have chosen to have their freedom of deci-
sionmaking curbed to the extent necessary to comply with the statutory
requirements for federal funding.
Finally, the comment will explore the idea that refusing to allow equal
socialization benefits from participation in age-appropriate placements consti-
tutes discrimination under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It will also
explore the suggestion that, in some situations, affirmative modification of
programs may be required to avoid such discrimination.
II
POE CASE
A. Educational Placement
At the time of the hearing, Clint Poe was an 18-year-old moderately
retarded student attending public school in the Durham County School
System (hereinafter also referred to as the local educational agency or LEA or
school system). He was classified as trainable mentally handicapped (TMH)6
5. Administrative Hearing Decision at 2 (Durham, N.C. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearing
Decision]. The transcript of this hearing is recorded in three volumes, hereinafter cited as I, II or III
Hearing Transcript.
6. Mental retardation is "a term referring to that group of conditions characterized by a) slow
rate of maturation, b) reduced learning capacity, and c) inadequate social adjustment, present singly
or in combination and associated with intellectual functioning which is below the average
range .. " C. GOOD, DICTIONARY OF EDUCATION 499 (3d ed. 1973). Mentally retarded individuals
are classified according to IQ range. Trainable mentally retarded individuals function in approxi-
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and was functioning academically at approximately the first grade level. 7 The
level of his social functioning was in dispute. The LEA contended that he was
functioning at a pre-teen social level, while his parents and community
acquaintances argued that he functioned well among persons of his own age
and older.8 Clint was receiving academic instruction in a self-contained class-
room for TMH students located in a junior high school. Though he was not
interacting with nonhandicapped students in the classroom, he did have an
opportunity to do so at lunch time, between classes, and during field trips and
other extracurricular activities.9
A survey of his placement history reveals that Clint was never placed in a
school containing chronological age peers. Upon entering the Durham
County School System in 1973 at age nine, he was placed in the TMH pro-
gram which was then located at the Kindergarten Center.' 0 He remained
there through the 1975-76 school year when the school system established a
second location for its TMH program. At age twelve, Clint moved with his
class to a sixth grade center where he remained for three school years until
age fifteen. "
In 1979, in response both to parental requests for age-appropriate place-
ment for their retarded children and to a similar recommendation from its
own TMR Study Committee, the LEA established a TMH class at the junior
high school level.' 2 Clint moved there at age fifteen and remained in that
mately the 40-60 IQrange and are capable of being trained "to perform some personally and socially
useful operations, but . . . cannot acquire functional literacy." Id. at 362. Educable mentally
retarded individuals fall within the 50-75 IQrange, "do not exhibit unusual or erratic behavior, are
not necessarily marked by any special physical stigmata . . . are almost indistinguishable from the
normal population," and may be expected to achieve literacy to the fourth or fifth grade level. Id.
Clint's psychological tests indicate that he did not fit the classical pattern for either TMH or EMH
students. The parties, however, agreed that he functioned as a moderately retarded or TMH
student.
7. Hearing Review Decision at 4 (Raleigh, N.C. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hearing Review
Decision].
8. Id.
9. Brief for Appellants at 7, Poe v. Durham County Schools, No. 82-2566 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Appellants' Brief].
10. Although Clint had begun his schooling in a TMH placement in another school system,
upon first entering the Durham County System, his parents agreed to try placing Clint in an EMH
program because he was testing at a mildly retarded level and because they considered the Kinder-
garten Center an undesirable location for the TMH class. However, Clint was not successful in the
EMH program housed in a "regular" elementary school, and his parents agreed to return him to a
TMH placement. Petitioners' Brief at 1, Administrative Hearing for Clint Poe (Durham, N.C. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Petitioners' Brief].
11. Id.
12. In fact, during the 1977-78 school year a group of concerned parents in the Durham City
and Durham County School Systems studied the question of appropriate educational placement for
retarded children. An early suggestion for a center for handicapped students segregated from both
school systems eventually was rejected by the majority. Instead, based upon their studies of learning
principles including role modeling, normalization, and least restrictive environment, 489 parents
(184 parents of handicapped children and 305 parents of nonhandicapped children) endorsed a plan
which called for "education in the least restrictive environment, placement of handicapped children
in age appropriate settings, four levels of school placement (pre-school, elementary, junior high, and
high school), a strong vocational program, and access to extracurricular and 'nonacademic' activi-
ties." Petitioners' Brief at 1.
After the plan was presented to both school systems in May 1978, the Durham County School
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placement through the 1981-82 school year, when his due process LEA
hearing was held. He was then eighteen years old.
The LEA argued that Clint could interact with chronological age peers
even though placed at the junior high level because the school population
included older nonhandicappped students. However, a study of the non-
handicapped junior high school population at Clint's school showed that, of
the total 858 students attending:
- 600 were 14 years of age or younger
- ll3were 15
- 18 were 16
- 3 were 17
- 0 were 18 (Clint's age).' 3
Clint's teacher for 1981-82 suggested in the proposed 1982-83 individual-
ized education program (IEP) developed for Clint that a high school place-
ment would be preferred.' 4 Durham County Schools did offer a program for
mentally retarded students at the high school level, but it was designed for
educable mentally handicapped (EMH) students and therefore was structur-
ally different from a TMH program. The Durham program offered one to
three class periods a day of academic work for EMH students in a separate
classroom. The students joined nonhandicapped students for nonacademic
classes and extracurricular activities.
Two TMH students who were functioning particularly well had moved into
this program at the high school with some success, and such placement was
offered to Clint. However, this program was not recommended for TMH stu-
dents because it did not offer the necessary curriculum, structure, or
pupil/teacher ratio for such students and the school system did not adapt the
program to accommodate entering TMH students.' 5 The Poes, therefore,
refused such placement, requesting instead that an appropriate TMH pro-
gram be established at the high school level so that Clint and other high-
school-aged TMH students could be taught separately from EMH students in
a self-contained classroom with appropriate vocational education, 16 yet could
System decided that it was not feasible to establish a joint program with the City Schools and set up
its own TMR Study Committee. After conducting its own study which included visiting other school
systems, the Committee reached the consensus that the system "should offer TMH classes in 'age-
appropriate' settings with nonhandicapped students in at least three settings-elementary, junior
high, and high school." Id.
13. Petitioners' Brief at 3.
14. Petitioners' Brief at 1, State Hearing Review (Raleigh, N.C. 1982).
15. Petitioners' Brief at 2; Appellants' Brief at 8.
16. The Poes requested in-school, hands-on vocational instruction for two hours daily to replace
the introductory and exploratory courses which Clint was receiving for two hours every other week.
They contended that the task training must be provided at the high school because of the programs
and facilities available there. Although both hearing officers found that Clint did indeed need
increased task training to prepare him for future employment and to allow him increased indepen-
dence, the officers found that it was not necessary to provide this training at the high school because
appropriate modifications could be made to his program at the junior high school. Hearing Decision
at 7; Hearing Review Decision at 7.
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be mainstreamed for lunch, assemblies, and school-wide events and possibly
mainstreamed for nonacademic subjects.
B. The Poes' Challenge
When the Durham School System refused to establish such a program at
the high school level, the Poes requested a hearing to determine whether the
EAHCA required that an appropriate educational program for Clint include a
high school placement with chronological age peers. In addition, they sought
a determination of whether the failure to make accommodations for Clint to
receive educational benefits and services in a high school with chronological
age peers was a denial of equal educational opportunity in violation of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Although the hearing officer heard extensive testimony, much of which
related to chronological age placement, she expressly declined to consider or
determine the issue of whether chronological age placement was a necessary
element of appropriate education for all trainable mentally retarded individ-
uals. Because she believed the purpose of the hearing was to determine the
appropriate placement for one individual, she did not allow the parties to fully
develop the issue on the record; she considered only evidence and testimony
specific to Clint's educational program, giving primary attention to his level of
performance and his identified strengths and weaknesses. 17
The hearing officer found that Clint's current placement in a self-con-
tained class at the junior high level was appropriate' 8 because no federal or
state regulation required "a local school administrative unit to set up a partic-
ular type of class at each level within the educational system or . . . [indi-
cated] that students, in order to receive an appropriate education, must be
placed in a school with students of the same age."' 9 She also found that sec-
tion 504 only required that handicapped children have an opportunity to par-
ticipate in nonacademic activities with nonhandicapped children-not
necessarily nonhandicapped age mates.20
These factual and legal findings were affirmed by a State Hearing Review
Officer. However, he specifically found that it was possible for a student "to
benefit in social skills development from contact with other persons of
approximately his chronological age," and that "the student could have
increased access to such persons by placement at the senior high school
level." 2 ' He also stated that he could not say that the parents' position was
without merit because Clint and other high-school-aged TMH students might
benefit from a self-contained class at the senior high school level and because
the class might thrive with the support of the school system and the commu-
17. Hearing Decision at 2.
18. The Hearing Officer did require certain vocational training modifications to the current IEP.
See supra note 16.
19. Hearing Decision at 6-7.
20. Id. at 7.
21. Hearing Review Decision at 5.
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nity. The Hearing Review Officer suggested, however, that the local board of
education would be the proper forum for requesting such a program, and that
based upon the record of this case he could not order the requested
placement. 22
III
APPROPRIATE EDUCATION UNDER PUBLIC LAw No. 94-142
The Poes' major argument under the EAHCA23 was that Clint was not
receiving the "appropriate" education which is required by the statute. To
evaluate the validity of this argument, one must consider what is meant by
"appropriate."
The EAHCA provides federal funds to assist state and local education
agencies in educating their handicapped students. To qualify for such funds,
a state must comply with the objectives and procedures established by the Act.
The statute contains both procedural and substantive requirements. How-
ever, the procedural requirements far outweigh the substantive requirements
in number, complexity, and specificity. 24 The goals, programs, and timetables
of the state plan which must be submitted 25 and the methods for challenging
the appropriateness of particular educational programs 26 are spelled out in
great detail, whereas the major substantive requirement of the Act is merely
that the state provide a "free appropriate public education" to handicapped
children. 27 As one commentator noted, "in effect, the Act guarantees proce-
dures whereby parents may challenge the appropriateness of their child's edu-
cational program, but provides only the most general guidelines for resolving
the substantive questions such challenges may present." 28
Because of the lack of substantive guidelines, most disputes have involved
the meaning of "appropriate" education. Some commentators and courts
concluded that Congress did not define the term because it intended that the
22. Id. at 17.
23. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982)).
24. In fact, one commentator noted that "it is difficult to find, in other Federal legislation con-
cerning matters of such traditional local concern as education, a statute that is so prescriptive in its
procedural obligations." EHLR Analysis, What Rowley Means, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP,
(CRR) SA-29, -34 (Supp. 84, Nov. 12, 1982).
There are good reasons for not creating specific substantive requirements for educational pro-
grams for the handicapped. Given the broad range of handicapping conditions covered by the
statute, it would be virtually impossible to write generic requirements for educational programs
without ignoring important differences among individuals. See infra Part III B. The lack of agreement
among educators as to the most effective programs for certain handicapped students would also
make Congress reluctant to adopt specific guidelines, especially since statutory adoption of certain
methods would tend to stop potentially valuable experimentation at the local level. Furthermore,
Congress is particularly wary of ordering specific programs because of the traditional notion that
education is primarily a state and local concern. See infra part V; Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appro-
priate" Education: The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1108-
09 (1979).
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1413 (1982).
26. Id. § 1415(b), (e)(2).
27. Id. § 1412(1).
28. Note, supra note 24, at 1103.
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courts and hearing officers should do so. 29 Although admitting that the defi-
nition "tends toward the cryptic rather than the comprehensive," the
Supreme Court rejected this view in Board of Education v. Rowley, 30 finding that
the Act does indeed define the term "appropriate education." 3' Based upon
these statutory definitions, the majority stated a two-part standard3 2 which
may bear on the question of age- appropriate placement. A placement must
both benefit the child educationally and provide the child with an individual-
ized education program. This part of the comment addresses both of those
elements.
A. Educational Benefits
At this point in our history there is little dispute that education and the
benefits derived from education are not purely academic in nature. Education
is also an instrument for socialization-both teaching cultural values and
helping the child adjust to his environment. The Supreme Court accepted
this notion in Brown v. Board of Education33 when it found education to be a
principal instrument in developing good citizenship and cultural values, pre-
paring the child for later training, and helping him adjust normally to his envi-
ronment. 34  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 35 the Court further acknowledged the
importance of public education in preparing individuals to be "self-reliant
and self-sufficient participants in society" and accepted the view that the value
29. Stark, supra note 1, at 498 ("Nowhere does the EAHCA specify what is meant by an 'appro-
priate' education for handicapped children."); Rowley v. Board of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 533
(S.D.N.Y.) ("[Tihe Act itself does not define 'appropriate education' . . . it has been left entirely to
the courts and the hearing officers to give content to the requirement of an appropriate education."),
aff'd, 632 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
30. 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982).
31. The Court stated:
The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related services which (A)
have been provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without
charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) include an appropriate
preschool, elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are pro-
vided in conformity with the individualized education program required under section
1414(a)(5) of this title.
Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982)) (emphasis added).
"Special education" is defined as "specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guard-
ians, to meet the unique needs of a handicaapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction
in physical education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(16) (1982). "Related services" are "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and
other supportive services . . .as may be required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from spe-
cial education." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982).
32. The Court stated:
Insofar as a State is required to provide a handicapped child with a "free appropriate public
education," we hold that it satisfies this requirement by providing personalized instruction with
sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction. Such
instruction and services must be provided at public expense, must meet the State's educational
standards, must approximate the grade levels used in the State's regular education, and must
comport with the child's IEP.
458 U.S. at 203.
33. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
34. Id. at 493.
35. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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of all education must be assessed in terms of its capacity to prepare the child
for life. 3 6 Thus, socialization, social skill development, and the development
of self-sufficiency must be objectives of an appropriate education for every
student.
Congress recognized that it is particularly important that such nonaca-
demic components of education be offered to handicapped students; self-suf-
ficiency and self-respect were major goals of the legislation. As expressed on
the Senate floor, the goal and purpose of the statute was "to meet the unmet
needs of all handicapped children" which included "making them productive
citizens, capable of self-respect and pride which they rightly deserve." 37 Con-
gress based these goals for the education of handicapped students at least
partly on its assumption that spending the money to maximize the indepen-
dence and self-sufficiency of handicapped students would ultimately relieve
taxpayers of the burden of supporting unproductive members of society.
Congress argued that "[w]ith proper education services, many [handicapped
children] would be able to become productive citizens, contributing to society
instead of being forced to remain burdens. Others, through such services,
would increase their independence, thus reducing their dependence on
society."38
Some courts in determining an appropriate education for handicapped
students have considered whether a student was receiving necessary nonaca-
demic educational benefits as part of his program. As a district court in Texas
noted, "Full social interaction is an important part of today's educational cur-
riculum and is even more vital to a child . . . who necessarily suffers a certain
degree of isolation as a result of his handicap." 3 9 That court specifically
found that depriving a handicapped child of an opportunity to interact fully
with his peers constituted a deprivation of educational benefits. 40
Advocates of age-appropriate placement argue that the handicapped stu-
dent's social skills and self-respect are enhanced by such placement-in other
words, that the student receives nonacademic educational benefits necessary
to an appropriate education from the placement-while placement elsewhere
deprives the student of proper, age-appropriate role models. In the Poe case,
36. Id. at 221.
37. 121 CONG. REC. 37,413 (1975) (statement of Sen. Williams).
38. S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1425, 1433.
39. Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 913 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (granting motion for preliminary
injunction based upon likelihood of success under EAHCA).
40. Id. The court went on to discuss the fact that the placement was not providing an opportu-
nity for maximization of the student's social interaction skills commensurate with that provided other
children in the class and that, in view of all the circumstances, he might be deprived of a full educa-
tional opportunity. These statements are very similar to the New York district court's definition of
appropriate education--an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the
opportunity provided to other children"-which was later discredited by the Supreme Court in
Rowley. 458 U.S. at 186. However, the Rowley decision should not be fatal to the holding in Espino
that the child's placement was inappropriate since the court had specifically found that the student
was receiving no educational benefits from the placement and that the placement might not be in
conformity with his IEP. Espino, 520 F. Supp. at 913.
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one expert witness testified that contact with chronological age peers would
increase Clint's chance of modeling older students' behavior and allow him to
profit from incidental learning-learning from his surroundings. 4 1 The
Supreme Court seemed to approve of this type of learning in Wisconsin v. Yoder
as a means of preparing the child for his adult role at least "during the crucial
and formative adolescent period of life." 42 "During this period, the children
must acquire Amish attitudes . . .and the specific skills needed to perform
the adult role . . . . These traits, skills, and attitudes admittedly fall within
the category of those best learned through example and 'doing' rather than in
the classroom. ' 4 3
In the special education context, providing the child with an opportunity
to benefit from age-appropriate role models was a major reason for bringing
handicapped children into the public schools. As several writers have argued,
"With systematic instruction, many severely handicapped students can be
taught to learn by imitating many of the appropriate actions of their chrono-
logical age peers. Interaction with nonhandicapped students thus provides
the potential instructional advantage of having access to constructive
models. . .. "44 This "contact for normalization" was cited by the teacher of
a high school EMH program in Durham County as the reason for including
mainstreaming as one of the three components necessary for an appropriate
TMH program. 45 In his opinion this would mean placing the program for
high-school-aged students in or near the high school building so that students
could have contact with others of the same age and size. 46 One of the experts
testifying for Clint Poe succinctly stated the argument for moving the present
TMH academic program to the high school: "Methods can be used anywhere
and should be. Age-appropriate models are hard to provide outside of the
place where age-appropriate models go to school." '47
The importance of providing age-appropriate models as part of a handi-
capped child's educational program has been noted by several courts in deter-
mining the appropriateness of an educational placement. In Campbell v.
Talladega County Board of Education,48 the court ordered that the educational
program of an 18-year-old severely retarded student include increased con-
tact with nonhandicapped students based on the fact that "considerable evi-
dence established that such interaction is essential to provide him with role
41. I Hearing Transcript at 48-50 (testimony of Kenneth Jens, Clinical Associate Professor of
Special Education at the University of North Carolina).
42. 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
43. Id.
44. Brown, Branston, Hamre-Nietupski, Johnson, Wilcox & Gruenewald, A Rationale for Compre-
hensive Longitudinal Interactions Between Severely Handicapped Students and Nonhandicapped Students and Other
Citizens, AAESPH REV., Spring 1979, at 7.
45. III Hearing Transcript at 171 (testimony of Peter Hoyt, teacher of high school EMH
program).
46. Id. at 174.
47. I Hearing Transcript at 48 (testimony of Kenneth Jens, Clinical Associate Professor of Spe-
cial Education at the University of North Carolina).
48. 518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
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models . . .,"49 In reaching its decision, the court relied upon expert testi-
mony that "considerable interaction between nonhandicapped and mentally
handicapped children may be achieved when they are educated under the
same roof and that such integration has been attained successfully in school
districts across the country." 50
Similarly, in Mallory v. Drake,5 ' a Missouri state court upheld a hearing
panel's decision that a severely handicapped student should be placed in a
classroom with other severely handicapped children "located in a public
school setting where she will have access to social interaction and modeling of
less handicapped children. ' 5 2 And again, in Hines v. Pitt County Board of Educa-
tion,53 a federal district court in North Carolina, considering the proper resi-
dential placement for a 10-year-old emotionally handicapped student,
specifically found that "an appropriate peer group for [the] plaintiff would be
made up of children ages eight through ten." 54 The court then studied the
ages of the student population in the student's current placement (which
included no 10-year-olds, four 1 1-year-olds and nineteen children ranging
from 12 to 17) and concluded that it was insufficient to meet his need for an
appropriate peer group. 55 In reaching its decision, the court relied upon
expert testimony that the age of the child's peer group was of primary
importance. 5 6
At the admininstrative hearing for Clint Poe, the school system countered
the Poes' contention that Clint could benefit educationally from a high school
placement by arguing that inclusion in the high school program actually
would be harmful to Clint due to the risk that he would be ridiculed and
would be unable to fit in. 5 7 It argued that TMH students in a self-contained
classroom would be isolated from the rest of the students, that the greater
tendency of high school students, as compared to junior high school students,
is to operate as individuals rather than as part of a group, and that this ten-
dency would make it harder for the TMH students to make friends and
interact with nonhandicapped students.58
There was, however, contrary testimony that the tendency of high school
students to make decisions as individuals rather than as part of a group, cou-
49. Id. at 55.
50. Id. at 50.
51. 616 S.W.2d 124 (Mo. App. 1981).
52. Id. at 127.
53. 497 F. Supp. 403, (E.D.N.C. 1980).
54. Id. at 407.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 408.
57. Respondent's Brief at 6, Administrative Hearing for Clint Poe (Durham, N.C. 1982) [herein-
after cited as Respondent's Briefl.
The Durham County System also contended that this conclusion was based upon its unsuccessful
experience with a self-contained classroom for retarded students located at one of its high schools
during the late 1960's and early 1970's. It is undisputed, however, that this program was entirely
self-contained for all school activities, both academic and nonacademic, and that the current program
for EMH students which included appropriate mainstreaming for nonacademic instruction and other
school activities was successful. Appellants' Brief at 15; Respondent's Brief at 10.
58. Respondent's Brief at 10-11.
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pled with their greater maturity and volunteerism, would make them more
likely to react positively to such a class. 59 The view that contact with age-
appropriate peers was beneficial rather than harmful was also suported by
actual experience within the Durham County School System. Clint's teacher
observed an improvement in the social skills and behavior exhibited by him
and others in his TMH class when they were moved from a sixth grade center
to the junior high setting, a setting which, at the time, provided more age-
appropriate peers. 60 Also, the teacher of the EMH program at the high school
testified to behavioral gains and improved self-esteem achieved (though not
without difficulty) by the two borderline EMH/TMH students who joined his
program. 6 1 Further support for the view that such contact within a high
school setting was beneficial to TMH students was provided by testimony that
other school systems in North Carolina which were educating TMH students
in age-appropriate high school settings reported successful educational pro-
grams, including observable improvements in the social behavior of handi-
capped students. 62
The EAHCA clearly supports the argument that such interaction is benefi-
cial, not harmful. As one hearing officer concluded:
The statutes do not consider social interaction with peers to be harmful .... Rather,
the statutes contemplate that interaction with similarly handicapped children or non-
handicapped children will be a positive social experience for the child and that interac-
tion with ... children of approximately the same age will be socially beneficial to the
child's development.6 3
The EAHCA also seems to contemplate that an appropriate education is to
be provided at the proper chronological age level, as the definition of free
appropriate public education "include[s] an appropriate preschool, elemen-
tary, or secondary school education in the State involved." 64 The Rowley
Court included this requirement in its definitional checklist of items which
must be satisfied, stating that the personalized instruction and supportive
services provided the child must "approximate the grade levels used in the
State's regular education." 65 Since many handicapped students, especially
retarded students, will never be able to approximate the grade levels of a reg-
ular education academically, the statute must refer to placement of children in
approximately the grade level that nonhandicapped children their age would
attend. Most school systems allow this type of age placement for nonhandi-
capped children despite failure to meet grade level academic standards. The
superintendent of the Durham County School System testified that placement
59. Petitioners' Brief at 4; Appellants' Brief at 15.
60. Appellants' Brief at 16.
61. III Hearing Transcript at 174-75 (testimony of Peter Hoyt, teacher of high school EMH
program).
62. II Hearing Transcript at 125-27 (testimony of Lynn Whitley, Advocate, Governor's Advo-
cacy Council for Persons with Disabilities); see also Appellants' Brief at 15-16.
63. In re Tracy, 1981-82 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 503:297, :299 (Ill. SEA 1982)
(hearing officer approved placement of 14-year-old girl in public school behaviorally disordered class
despite parents' request for residential placement).
64. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18)(C) (1982).
65. 458 U.S. at 189.
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for nonhandicapped students was allowed in his system, at least through the
tenth grade, on the basis of psychological considerations, academics, social
skills, and other subjective criteria. 66 In accordance with the statute, then, this
local practice should be followed for handicapped students as well.
The State Hearing Review Officer in the Poe case reached an interesting
conclusion with respect to the requirement of approximating the grade levels
of the state's regular education. He considered it arguable that the clear lan-
guage of the statute required the TMH program to be provided both at the
elementary and the secondary levels. State law defined elementary and secon-
dary education; in North Carolina, elementary school included grades one
through eight while grades nine through twelve made up secondary school.
Local school systems, however, could choose to operate a junior high school
including no more than grades seven through nine which would be a hybrid
elementary/secondary school. Therefore, according to the hearing review
officer, the Durham County School System arguably satisfied the specific man-
date of the statute by providing education at both an elementary and secon-
dary level by placing the program at a junior high.67
Following this logic, handicapped classes containing children from age 6
to 18 (approximately first grade through twelfth grade for nonhandicapped
children) could be placed in such hybrid schools which would "arguably . . .
provid[e] education both at the elementary and the secondary levels." 68 Such
a situation would allow a significant departure from the congressional man-
date that education be provided at regular educational levels.
The language of the EAHCA supports placement of handicapped children
at regular educational levels. This preference reflects the general under-
standing that education includes nonacademic benefits such as the develop-
ment of social skills and cultural values. Because the development of social
skills and self-reliance was an important purpose of the EAHCA, some courts,
in determining an appropriate education for handicapped children, have
already considered age-appropriate placement as one method of helping
handicapped children achieve these skills. Such nonacademic benefits should
therefore be considered under the Rowley standard in determining the content
of an appropriate education in every case. Whether such educational benefits
are required for a particular handicapped child would be determined by his
"unique needs" as identified in his individualized education program.
B. Individualization
Although the EAHCA as a whole has a broad goal-to provide a free
appropriate public education for all handicapped children-it seeks to accom-
plish this goal by focusing on each individual handicapped student in order to
identify and meet his specific educational needs. As one court pointed out,
the Act "represents a clear national commitment to meet each handicapped
66. III Hearing Transcript at 19-23.
67. Hearing Review Decision at 17.
68. Id.
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child's special needs in as integrated and complete a way as possible." 69
Congress recognized that being handicapped is a complex, multidimen-
sional condition 70 and therefore made no effort to establish educational pro-
grams or standards for each handicapping condition. 7 1 Instead, it provided
that an individualized education program (IEP) must be developed for each
handicapped child. 72 As one of the statute's supporters remarked during the
House debate, "Because handicapped children are unique, setting up plans
for each one makes good sense." 73
The IEP prescribed by the Act is a written plan
developed jointly by the local education agencies, a teacher involved with the specific
education of the handicapped child, and his parents or guardian. The plan [includes]
a statement of the child's present level of educational performance, a statement of the
goals to be achieved, a statement of the specific services which will have to be pro-
vided, a projected date for initiation and duration of the services, and criteria and
evaluation procedures for determining whether the objectives are being met.7 4
One of the Act's sponsors viewed the plan as an important means of achieving
the goals of the statute: "Individualized plans are of great importance in the
education of handicapped children in order to help them develop their full
potential." 75
In evaluating an educational program, hearing officers and courts must
consider whether the program was designed to meet the unique needs of the
handicapped child as developed in the IEP. As one court declared, "[T]here
can be little doubt that by requiring attention to 'unique needs,' the Act
demands that special education be tailored to the individual." 76 The court
then took action to implement this requirement, holding that Pennsylvania
could not inflexibly apply its absolute standard of a maximum 180-day school
year to handicapped children because such a practice precluded consideration
of individual needs. 77
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Rowley that whether a
handicapped child is benefiting educationally must also be determined by
considering the child's unique abilities, needs, and related educational goals.
The Court specifically stated that it was not attempting "to establish any one
test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all
children by the Act" because of the difficulty of answering this question for
the broad spectrum of handicapping conditions. 78
One commentator has suggested that the Rowley standard therefore calls
69. Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1226 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), affd in part, vacated in part,
623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
70. Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976
U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1065 [hereinafter cited as Primer for the New Advocate].
71. See supra note 24.
72. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(a)(5) (1982) (definition).
73. 121 CONG. REC. 23,707 (1975) (statement of Congressman Quie).
74. Id.
75. 121 CONG. REC. 23,705 (1975)(statement of Congressman Brademas).
76. Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 280 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
77. Id.
78. 458 U.S. at 202.
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for a two-pronged approach. 79 First, the child's abilities, needs, and objec-
tives must be examined. Then the program must be examined to determine
whether it benefits the child in terms of his or her uniqueness. 80 Such an
analysis will focus even greater attention on the precise nature of the indi-
vidual handicapped child's needs and abilities-"including needs for emo-
tional as well as intellectual development"-in making and reviewing
decisions.8 '
Social skill development may be included in the needs and goals described
by an IEP. Indeed, it was identified as a primary educational goal for Clint
Poe by several witnesses who cited lack of social skills as the main reason for
vocational failure by the mentally retarded.8 2 These witnesses considered this
goal more important than many of the academic goals identified in Clint's
IEP, an assertion which was uncontested by the school system.
Furthermore, in Clint's IEP, his teacher described him as "behaving
socially in an age-appropriate manner, being well-liked by peers, and demon-
strating 'normalized' social skills."83 She therefore recommended in his IEP
for 1981-82 that Clint be offered a high school program. This recommenda-
tion was supported by Clint's most recent psychological evaluation which
stated that the lack of opportunity to interact with chronological age peers was
one reason for his scoring at a pre-adolescent level in social development, and
added that he would benefit from more contact with high school age peers. 84
Thus, Clint was being denied educational benefits necessary to meet his
unique needs and objectives.
Although the importance of a chronological age peer group for meeting
the socialization needs of a handicapped student has been litigated in few
reported decisions, it has been a factor in several decisions. One California
hearing considered an almost identical issue to the Poe question-whether for
integration to be appropriate, it must be with nonhandicapped peers who are
chronologically age equivalent rather than mentally age equivalent.8 5
Although the California hearing officer felt that the addition of chronologi-
cally age-appropriate integration would make the educational program ideal,
the lack of such integration did not make the program inappropriate.8 6 In
fact, the hearing officer opined that although the student might receive great
79. Wegner, Variations on a Theme: The Concept of Equal Educational Opportunity and Programming
Decisions under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter
1985, at 169, 186.
80. Id. at 186.
81. Id. at 187.
82. Petitioners' Brief at 23.
83. Appellants' Brief at 10.
84. Petitioners' Brief at 3.
85. In re Marin County Office of Educ., 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:162
(Cal. SEA 1982).
86. 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. at 504:165. Compare this finding with the statement
by the Hearing Review Officer in the Clint Poe case that the Poes' position was not without merit
because it could be that TMH students aged 16 to 18 would benefit from a class located at the high
school and that the class might thrive, but that the evidence on the record did not show that it was
required by the student. Hearing Review Decision at 17.
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benefits from chronologically age equivalent nonhandicapped peer integra-
tion, it did not follow that integration with similarly functioning handicapped
students would not bring its own unique benefits. 87
This analysis seems to be based upon a "net benefits" determination.
Under this approach, if the student is benefiting from the program in any way
or if the student is receiving more benefit than harm, the educational program
is deemed appropriate. Although it has been argued that this is the Rowley
standard, 88 both the thrust of the statute towards individualization and the
Rowley Court's recognition that a single benefits test cannot be articulated,
suggest a benefits test which addresses the specific abilities, needs, and objec-
tives of the individual. Thus, in determining whether a student is benefiting
educationally from a placement, one should carefully scrutinize the student's
needs and goals and ask whether they will be addressed in the particular
placement. If all the student's needs cannot be met equally well in one place-
ment, then one must determine the primary needs and meet those first and
best.
Two other cases have analyzed the placement decision by considering the
importance of the peer group in relation to the unique needs of the individual
student. In re Matthew S. 89 involved a hearing to determine whether a pro-
foundly deaf 7-year-old boy should continue in his placement at a learning
center for the deaf or move to a public school's hearing impaired class which
included students aged 6 to 8. The agency heard testimony that Matthew's
paramount need at the time was "to strengthen his self-esteem, peer group
identity, and social skills in the deaf community" where he could "find
friends, competitors, and role models." 90 As in the Poe case, all agreed that
the student could "learn his academics in either setting," so the hearing
officer found that the question of his placement could not be dictated by his
academic needs. Rather, the importance of socialization and peer group iden-
tity issues "made [the public school placement] inappropriate at this time." 9'
Thus, in this case the student was not placed with age peers but with deaf
peers. The placement points out the importance of determining with preci-
sion the socialization needs of the individual and meeting those needs in
making a placement decision. For Matthew, it was determined that his need
to socialize with other deaf students outweighed his need to interact with
others in the community who could hear. The hearing officer was careful to
note that this placement was necessary to meet his present socialization
needs-the implication being that such needs may change over time as Mat-
thew becomes adjusted to the deaf community. He then may need to move
out into the hearing community, and this change in his needs would trigger a
corresponding change in placement.
87. Id.
88. Wegner, supra note 79, at 186.
89. 1980-81 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 502:346 (Mass. SEA 1981).
90. Id. at 502:347.
91. Id.
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In Hines v. Pitt County Board of Education,92 a federal district court deter-
mined that placement of a 10-year-old emotionally handicapped student in a
school with students aged 11 through 18 was inappropriate. Finding that
"[flor Brad, . . . the most important factor in that determination is his peer
group," the court relied on "[t]he testimony of all the expert witnesses who
pointed out that the age of the peer group was very important to Brad's fur-
ther education, although they disagreed as to its relative importance vis-a-vis
other desirable factors."'95 The court canvassed the population at his present
placement and found that of the twenty-three children currently enrolled,
there were no 10-year-old children and four 11-year-old children, with all
other children ranging in age from 12 through 17. The court therefore found
the current child population not appropriate to meet the unique needs of the
plaintiff for a chronological age peer group and determined that he was
appropriately placed in a program designed for pre-adolescent children. 94
The Durham County School System argued that the junior high placement
was appropriate to meet Clint's socialization needs based upon the presence
of nonhandicapped high-school-aged students at the junior high school and
the support of its SCREEN (placement) team decision for the junior high
school placement. 95 The first contention, that chronological age peers were
available at the junior high school, was belied by the kind of canvassing of the
student population which the Hines court used. Of the nonhandicapped stu-
dents among the 858 students at the junior high, none were 18; only 3 were
17 years old; 18 were 16 years old; 113 were 15 years old; and the vast
majority were 14 years old and younger. Therefore, less than 3 percent of the
student population was 16 or older.96 The analysis of the Hines court, there-
fore, would lead to a finding that the junior high placement was inappropriate
because it was insufficient to meet Clint's unique needs for an appropriate
peer group.
The Durham County SCREEN team did recommend continued placement
at the junior high school despite Clint's teacher's recommendation for high
school placement in his IEP. However, testimony of SCREEN team members
at the hearing indicated that they considered the junior high placement to be
the best available and that they had, therefore, recommended it because they
were unable to recommend any placement that was not currently available in
92. 497 F. Supp. 403 (E.D.N.C. 1980).
93. Id. at 408 (emphasis in original). Cf Grkman v. Scanlon, 528 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (W.D. Pa.
1981) (closeness in age to other pupils merely considered one advantage of continued placement at
center for deaf students), remanded, 707 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1982) (to be reconsidered in light of
Rowley), reh'g, 563 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (ordered current evaluation and IEP); In re Brockton
Pub. Schools, 1982-83 EDuc. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:128 (Mass. SEA 16, 1982) (lack of
sufficient peer group because of age gap between 5-year-old handicapped student and other students
aged 8, 10, and 12 considered as a factor in placement decision).
94. 497 F. Supp. at 407.
95. Petitioners' Brief at 3-4. The State Hearing Review Officer evidently accepted the argument
that chronological age peers were available at the junior high school, because he specifically found
that the LEA had provided the student with opportunities for contact with his chronological age
peers. Conclusion of Law No. 12, Hearing Review Decision at 9.
96. Petitioners' Brief at 3.
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the school system. Two of these witnesses stated that if a high school place-
ment had been available it could have been considered appropriate for
Clint.97
This limitation upon the SCREEN team's ability to make recommenda-
tions seems to bear out the fears of early commentators on the statute who
felt that although the content of the appropriate education to meet each indi-
vidual's needs was to be developed through the IEP, "it is perhaps more likely
that the needs of the child will only be delineated in terms of the services
actually available." 98 This type of limitation is totally inappropriate under the
statute. For, as another commentator noted, "Congress has focused on the
individual child's needs rather than those of the state as the standard by which
the provision of educational benefits is to be measured." 99 Thus, although
other factors which a school system takes into account, such as cost,100 may be
considered in an effort to weigh the needs of the individual nonhandicapped
student against those of other handicapped and nonhandicapped students,
this weighing should not take place until after the needs of the handicapped
individual have been evaluated. Then, the system may consider existing
resources (not programs) to decide how best to meet as many of the needs of
all children in the system as possible.
IV
LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT UNDER PUBLIC LAW No. 94-142
Although the EAHCA does not specify the substantive content of an
appropriate program, "[t]o direct placement decisions, it does include the
requirement that handicapped children should be educated together with the
nonhandicapped 'to the maximum extent appropriate.' "101 Handicapped
children should be removed from the regular educational environment only
when the nature or severity of their handicap requires removal in order to
provide a proper education. This requirement, popularly know as main-
streaming, is an integration principle distinct from the definition of the appro-
priate educational program, which states a preference for where educational
services should be provided. 0 2 As such, it is "an antisegregation principle,
97. Id. at 4.
98. Haggerty & Sacks, Education of the Handicapped: Towards a Definition of an Appropriate Education,
50 TEMP. L.Q. 961, 989 (1977); see also Note, supra note 24, at 1109-10 ("Even assuming good faith
on the part of school officials in dealing with the problems of handicapped children, budgetary con-
straints will inevitably color many decisions and restrict the range of alternatives offered in the for-
mulation of individualized educational programs . . . . [1]ocal school administrators may focus on
what is available within the school system rather than on what is most appropriate for an individual
child.").
99. Primer for the New Advocate, supra note 70, at 1065.
100. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 107, 112-13 (W.D. Va. 1981); see infra notes 122-
25 and accompanying text.
101. Note, supra note 24, at 1106 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1976)). Indeed, one commen-
tator sees this placement directive as the "only substantive requirement" of the Act. Stark, supra note
1, at 482.
102. See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 196
(1983) ("The use of 'appropriate' in the language of the Act, although by no means definitive, sug-
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analogous to that established in Brown v. Board of Educ[ation]' designed to stop
the automatic institutionalization and isolation of most handicapped chil-
dren.' 0 3 Congress was "concerned that children with handicapping condi-
tions be educated in the most normal and least restrictive setting, for how else
will they adapt to the world beyond the educational environment, and how
else will the nonhandicapped adapt to them?"' 10 4
The regulations promulgated pursuant to the EAHCA add greater
meaning to the requirement. In addition to repeating the requirement that
separate schooling or removal from the regular educational environment
occurs only when required by the nature or severity of the handicap,10 5 the
regulations require each agency to insure the availability of a continuum of
alternative placements to meet the needs of all handicapped children.' 0 6 The
regulations also make clear that the least restrictive environment requirement
applies to nonacademic services, including extracurricular services, meals,
and recess periods. 10 7 In determining the placement for a specific handi-
capped child, the regulations require that the placement be based upon his
IEP. Unless the IEP requires some other arrangement, the child must be edu-
cated in the school which he or she would attend if not handicapped.' 08
In the Poe case, the Hearing Review Officer found that because the least
restrictive environment language referred only to contact with nonhandi-
capped persons, it did not require "age groupings."' 1 9 The Poes argued that,
although there may not be an absolute requirement of chronological age
placement for every child, the language of the regulations does assume the
least restrictive environment requirement normally will involve placement
with age peers unless the individual's handicapping condition makes such
placement impossible. First, the regulations state that removal from the reg-
ular educational environment is not preferred, but allowed only when ade-
gests that Congress used the word as much to prescribe the settings in which handicapped children
should be educated as to prescribe the substantive content or supportive services of their educa-
tion."). Cf Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n.21. This statement supports the notion that setting is part of
the definition of "appropriate" as discussed in part III rather than the idea that the least restrictive
environment requirement is not a distinct integration principle which determines where the appro-
priate education will be provided.
103. Stark, supra note 1, at 482 n. 18.
104. 120 CONG. REC. 15,272 (1974) (statement of Sen. Stafford).
105. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b) (1984).
106. Id. § 300.551.
107. Id. §§ 300.306, .553.
108. Id. § 300.552(c).
109. Hearing Review Decision at 16. It is true that reported decisions generally refer to pro-
viding contact with nonhandicapped students without specifically considering age. See, e.g., Campbell
v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Mallory v. Drake, 616 S.W.2d
124 (Mo. App. 1981); In re Educ. Assignment of Michael G., 1983-84 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP.
(CRR) 505:188 (Pa. SEA 1983); cf. In re Main County Office of Educ., 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED
L. REP. (CRR) 504:162 (Cal. SEA 1982).
Although the issue in Main County was framed in terms of integration- whether for integration
to be appropriate, it must be with chronological age equivalent nonhandicapped peers rather than
mental age equivalent peers-the discussion and decision turned upon the "threshold question of
appropriateness." Id. at 504:165.
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quate education cannot be provided in regular classes." 0 Thus, the regular
educational environment for nonhandicapped students is a classroom setting
with others of his same age. Whether a handicapped student should be
removed from this setting then depends upon the special needs imposed by
his handicap as determined in his IEP.
Furthermore, the regulations require that the student be placed in the
school he would attend if not handicapped-that is, with chronological age
peers-unless the IEP requires something different."' Therefore, the stu-
dent's IEP must include a statement describing the extent to which he will be
able to take part in regular educational programs. These regulations empha-
size the fact that Congress envisioned a combination of possible settings in a
handicapped child's educational program." 12 For example, a student may be
able to attend all regular classes with support services added, to attend special
academic classes with mainstreaming for nonacademic classes, or to attend
special classes with mainstreaming for lunch, recess, and extracurricular activ-
ities. Once the child's ability to learn in regular classes and activities is deter-
mined, "any adjustment made in the educational plan for a child because of a
handicap must be scrutinized carefully to minimize the possibility that such a
plan might encourage rather than reduce developmental discrepancies
between that child and nonhandicapped students."' " 3
"Only if a child cannot be educated 'satisfactorily' in the regular classroom
either part of the time or all of the time should he or she be removed. Place-
ment must then be in the next least restrictive setting."" t4 The appropriate
setting is determined by looking over the continuum of alternatives provided
by the LEA and placing the child "in that environment which is consistent
with his needs, yet does not restrict his freedom to associate with his normal
peers [more] than is absolutely necessary.""l 5 As one court noted, this
requirement is especially important for children whose educational needs
necessitate their being solely with other handicapped children during most of
each day.' 16
If these standards are applied to the Poe case, it is apparent that Clint's
IEP did not require that he be removed from the regular age-appropriate
school which he would normally attend; it merely required that he be placed
in a self-contained classroom for academic instruction. In fact, as his IEP
reflected, Clint's social goals would be better implemented in the high school
110. 34 C.F.R. § 300.550 (1984).
111. Id. § 300.552.
112. Comment, The Least Restrictive Environment Section of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975: A Legislative History and an Analysis, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 717 (1978).
113. Brown, Wilcox, Sontag, Vincent, Dodd & Gruenewald, Toward the Realization of the Least
Restrictive Educational Environments for Severely Handicapped Students, AAESPH REV., Dec. 1977, at 195,
197 [hereinafter cited as Least Restrictive Environments].
114. Comment, supra note 112, at 776.
115. Goldgraber, Educating Severely Handicapped Children in the Least Restrictive Environment, 17 J.
SPECIAL EDUCATORS 401, 407 (1981).
116. Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 53 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (quoting
34 C.F.R. § 104, app. A, subpart D, 24).
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he would normally be attending. This placement would have provided the
"most normal setting in which the pupil can function effectively"I 17
-the goal
of the least restrictive environment.
Educators also support the argument that the least restrictive environment
mandate of the EAHCA requires placement with age-appropriate peers:
Severely handicapped students should interact with nonhandicapped students of
approximately the same chronological ages throughout their education. Placing sec-
ondary aged/young adult severely handicapped students in educational settings where
there are no nonhandicapped students of the same age is not acceptable. For
example, a wing serving severely handicapped students from ages five to twenty-five
attached to an elementary school serving nonhandicapped students from ages five to
twelve does not provide age appropriate peers for the severely handicapped students
over age twelve. It is therefore unduly restrictive. 
l1
Of course, individual needs may require removal from the regular school
setting in which the child would normally function. A Michigan hearing
officer found that a 20-year-old EMH student should remain at a center for
the retarded rather than moving to the public high school as requested by
parents because of specific findings that her directional and spatial difficulties
would make close supervision and monitoring necessary to allow her to move
around the large high school building.1 19 The public high school was consid-
ered to be far more restrictive and destructive to the development of peer
relationships than her present placement. Because of the finding that the
unique needs of the student actually made the center the least restrictive envi-
ronment, the hearing officer found it unnecessary to "compare the peer popu-
lation of the [placement alternatives] desired for modeling purposes. '"120
Cost may also be a factor in deciding whether a particular placement is
possible since excessive spending on one child may deprive other students,
handicapped and nonhandicapped, of educational benefits.' 2 1 At the Poe
hearing, there was conflicting testimony regarding the feasibility of estab-
lishing a self-contained program at the high school based upon cost, potential
transportation problems, and personnel reorganization. There was also a dis-
pute as to whether all alternatives for the high school program, including
those proposed by the Poes, had been explored by the school system. Further-
more, since the hearing was to determine an individual placement, the
Hearing Officer did not consider the possibility that other high-school-aged
TMH students might also be appropriately placed in the high school class if
one were available, causing a change in personnel, transportation, and other
cost-related factors. 122
As one court pointed out, although cost is a proper factor to consider, it
117. Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 98, at 972.
118. Least Restrictive Environments, supra note 113, at 198.
119. Case No. H-487, 1979-80 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 501:174, :175-76 (Mich. SEA
1979).
120. Id. at 501:176.
121. Pinkerton v. Moye, 509 F. Supp. 102 (W.D. Va. 1981).
122. Hearing Review Decision at 5-6, 14-15; Appellants' Brief at 16-18. The Hearing Officer
made no findings on the cost issue. The State Hearing Review Officer, however, accepted the evi-
dence introduced by the school system regarding changes which would have to be implemented to
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"is no defense. . if the school district has failed to use its funds to provide a
proper continuum of alternative placements for handicapped children."' 23
Based upon the language of the regulations, it might be said that a "proper"
continuum would include placement in an age-appropriate school unless the
IEP required something different. The Roncker court pointed out that "provi-
sion of such alternative placements benefits all handicapped children."' 12 4
This is even more likely in a system like Durham County where there are evi-
dently a number of handicapped children who might benefit from age-appro-
priate placements were they available.' 25
Because of the cost factor and because of traditional judicial reluctance to
invade local autonomy in the area of public education, some courts have
declined to order a particular placement which might involve creation of new
classes or programs (thus incidentally involving the court or officer in making
funding allocation decisions); instead, the least restrictive environment
requirement is stated as a mandate, and it is left to the schools to decide how
it is to be implemented. For example, one hearing officer found that the law
did not require the City of Cincinnati to recreate or duplicate its comprehen-
sive TMR program in a regular elementary school building but did require
that provisions be made for the handicapped child's interaction with non-
handicapped peers.' 26 It was thus up to the school system to decide how to
provide this interaction during the times it was appropriate for the student-
lunch, recess, and during extracurricular activities. Under this approach,
which represents one reasonable accommodation of the competing interests,
if the Durham County School System did not place Clint's class at the high
school, it would have to find another method to provide the requisite interac-
tion during lunch and extracurricular activities.
V
DEFERENCE TO LOCAL AUTONOMY UNDER PUBLIC LAW No. 94-142
At the Poe hearing, witnesses for the two parties expressed their beliefs
regarding two different theories of social development. The Poes' expert wit-
nesses believed that students of Clint's own chronological age would be role
models for him and that he could benefit from incidental learning, or learning
from his surroundings. 27 The school system argued that children learn social
skills sequentially and the fact that Clint's social skills tested at a pre-adoles-
provide high school placement for Clint alone without considering the alternatives proposed by the
Petitioners or the placement of other TMH students.
123. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063.
124. Id.
125. See Appellants' Brief at 8-9.
126. In re Cincinnati City School Dist., 1980-81 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 502:117,
:120 (Ohio SEA 1979); see also Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1061 (Ohio State Board of Education found that
academic instruction at a county school was appropriate but that provision should also be made to
provide interaction with nonhandicapped students at lunch and recess).
127. I Hearing Transcript at 48-50 (testimony of Kenneth Jens, Clinical Associate Professor of
Special Education at the University of North Carolina).
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cent level meant that he had junior high level social skills still to learn, which
could best be learned at the junior high school.' 28
The Hearing Officer did not consider this evidence in reaching her deci-
sion because it was her opinion that the purpose of the hearing was to deter-
mine the placement for one individual. She considered only evidence specific
to Clint's program, concentrating on his level of performance and his demon-
strated strengths and weaknesses. 129 The Hearing Review Officer did, how-
ever, make a specific finding that there is disagreement among educators
concerning the process of social development. Educators are divided
between the two theories argued by the Poes and by the school system, even
though the two theories are not mutually exclusive.' 30 This dispute points up
a difficult problem in making placement decisions and determining educa-
tional programs: when there is disagreement over learning theories, how
should a school system choose the method to be used for a particular handi-
capped student?
The response to almost any interesting question concerning the education of the
handicapped is either that the answer is unknown or that no generalizable beneficial
effect of a given treatment can be demonstrated. This lack of knowledge, which is
hardly peculiar to special education, makes it difficult to predict the consequences of
any policy change.' t'
Congress chose not to establish specific substantive guidelines for appro-
priate educational programs for handicapped students. Among the reasons,
evidently, was the difficulty of determining the best educational program for
students with particular handicaps and the desire not to inhibit continued
experimentation and innovation in the field of special education. 32 Recog-
nizing the importance of experimentation and innovation in education, partic-
ularly special education, and the desirability of implementing the best
available programs and techniques, Congress required the states to set up
procedures to ensure that information produced by educational research is
acquired and disseminated and that promising educational practices and
materials developed by such research are adopted.'3 3
The EAHCA does not, however, explain what qualifies as an educational
theory or mandate when a state or LEA must adopt a promising educational
practice. In other words, the statute does not provide specific guidelines for
educational programs, nor does it give any guidance as to how school districts
should decide which programs to use. The reason for the lack of specific man-
dates is probably that Congress felt constrained by its traditional deference
128. II Hearing Transcript at 154 (testimony of Jim Polk, Special Assistant to the Superinten-
dent for Community Education and Social Services); id. at 204 (testimony of Genevieve Ortman,
Director of Programs for Exceptional Children).
129. Hearing Decision at 2.
130. Finding of Fact No. 15, Hearing Review Decision at 5.
131. Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Pro-
posals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 47-48 (1974).
132. Note, supra note 24, at 1109.
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(3) (1982). The Rowley Court saw this directive as additional evidence
supporting the view that courts must show deference to the state's choice of an educational theory
when reviewing a challenge to a program's appropriateness. 458 U.S. at 207-08.
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towards state and local autonomy in the area of public education 34 -an area
historically left to local discretion except in the face of overriding national
policy concerns, such as racial integration. Thus, under the Act, state educa-
tional departments and local school boards "are given wide discretion to
apply their expertise to devise the package of services appropriate to their
locale and suited in some degree to each individual's capacities."'' 3 5
Since the Act provides for judicial review of substantive questions
regarding educational programs courts have also been cautioned to show def-
erence to local decisionmakers.
Because education generally reflects local values and interests, a court should bear in
mind that its judgment may to some degree be viewed as second-guessing collective
community wisdom. The importance of local control of education should encourage a
court to exercise restraint in deciding cases under the Act.
1 3 6
The Rowley opinion reiterated this view:
In assuring that the requirements of the Act have been met, courts must be careful to
avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States. The
primary responsibility for formulating the education to be accorded a handicapped
child, and for choosing the educational method most suitable to the child's needs, was
left by the Act to state and local educational agencies in cooperation with the parents
or guardian of the child. 1 3 7
Though realizing that states had the ultimate authority to choose educational
methods, commentators hoped that "agencies and courts reviewing local
schools' decisions as to appropriate education for the handicapped [would]
require the schools to make a showing that the curriculum and teaching
methods conform to a substantial body of expert opinion."' 38 One court
seemed to accept this view when it stated, albeit in dictum, that although a
school system need not "experiment with every new teaching technique that
may be suggested," it does have an obligation to keep abreast of changing
educational strategies and implement them where success "may be
demonstrated." 13 9
This standard suggests that evidence of successful programs utilizing age-
appropriate placement should be given substantial weight in making place-
ment decisions. The Poes, for example, introduced expert testimony
regarding a number of studies performed over a period of years which
showed that placements such as the one suggested by the Poes were quite
successful.' 40 There was also testimony that such programs were operating
134. Note, supra note 24, at 1109.
135. Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 98, at 994; see also, Comment, Self-Sufficiency Under the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act: A Suggested Judicial Approach, 1981 DUKE LJ. 516, 524 ("Aware of the
Act's potentially destructive impact on local decision-making, the drafters of the Act were concerned
that it reflect due regard for state and local sovereignty.").
136. Comment, supra note 135, at 529-30.
137. 458 U.S. at 207.
138. Haggerty & Sacks, supra note 98, at 994.
139. Rettig v. Kent County School Dist., 539 F. Supp. 768 (N.D. Ohio 1981), afrd in part, vacated
in part, 720 F.2d 463 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2379 (1984).
140. I Hearing Transcript at 48-49 (testimony of Kenneth Jens, Clinical Associate Professor of
Special Education at the University of North Carolina).
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successfully in other states' 4 ' and, closer to home, that such high school pro-
grams for TMH students were operating successfully and bringing about
improvements in the students' social behavior in other school districts in
North Carolina. 4 2
The question thus arises-would requiring the school system to accept a
mainstreaming method successfully adopted elsewhere violate the require-
ment of local autonomy in determining educational policy? The Rowley Court
recognized that courts lack the " 'specialized knowledge and experience' nec-
essary to resolve 'persistent and difficult questions of educational policy.' "143
On the other hand, the Court acknowledged that "once a court determines
that the requirements of the Act have been met, questions of methodology are
for resolution by the States."'' 44 In other words, courts have discretion to
determine whether the requirements of the statute are being met, that is,
whether a child's program provides an appropriate education and whether the
child is being educated in the least restrictive environment. School systems
may choose among teaching methods which meet these requirements. Thus,
judicial acceptance of a particular method may be mandated by the substan-
tive requirements of the Act if statutory requirements are being met through
the use of that method.
Cases decided since Rowley have recognized its distinction between ques-
tions of methodology and factual determinations. 4 5 The First Circuit, while
acknowledging that courts may not interfere with school authorities on issues
of educational policy, held that judges may resolve difficult and complicated
factual disputes regarding whether a child will benefit from a proposed place-
ment. The court found that the dispute involved "not a choice of educational
policy, but resolution of an individualizedfactual issue as to the effect of John's
handicap on his ability to benefit from the proposed school setting. This falls
within the scope of the question which Rowley says is for the court .... .146
In resolving these "individualized factual issues," courts tend to rely upon the
testimony of qualified witnesses; when a majority of such witnesses, especially
teachers who have continuously worked with the child, support a particular
program or service, their views usually convince the hearing officer or
judge.' 47 However, parties who demand a particular methodology without
141. Id. at 45 (witness had personal knowledge of thirteen to fourteen other programs in the
nation where Clint would be in a high school setting).
142. II Hearing Transcript at 124-27 (testimony of Lynn Whitley, Advocate, Governor's Advo-
cacy Council for Persons with Disabilities).
143. 458 U.S. at 208 (citing San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42
(1973)).
144. Id.
145. EHLR Analysis, Application of Rowley by Courts and SEAs, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L.
REP. (CRR) SA-107, -112 to -13 (Supp. 93, Apr. 1, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Application of Rowley].
146. Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 806 (1st Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original).
147. Application of Rowley, supra note 145, at SA-108. Courts and Hearing Officers rely heavily
upon the testimony of experts in the field of education including teachers and other school personnel
who have worked closely with the child in determining programs. See, e.g., In re Campbell v. Tal-
ladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 55 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (expert testimony relied upon
regarding successful programs in "school districts across the country"); Kruelle v. Biggs, 489 F.
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presenting convincing expert testimony that it is needed by the child, tend to
lose. 148
The Sixth Circuit made the same distinction between a question of educa-
tional methodology, such as that involved in Rowley, and a factual determina-
tion as to whether a particular placement qualified as the least restrictive
environment.1 49 The court found that "the question is not one of method-
ology but rather involves a determination of whether the school district has
satisfied the Act's requirement that handicapped children be educated along-
side nonhandicapped children to the maximum extent appropriate ....
Since Congress has decided that mainstreaming is appropriate, the states
Supp. 169 (D. Del. 1980) (school system recommendation refused and appropriate placement
ordered on basis of expert testimony), afd, 642 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1981); Brockton Pub. Schools,
1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:128, :131 (Mass. SEA 1982) (finding that no profes-
sional who had worked with or evaluated the student recommended the requested change of place-
ment); In re West Brookfield Pub. Schools, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 504:166, :169
(Mass. SEA 1982) (abundant expert evidence heard in support of need for full-time aide).
The decisionmakers have also relied upon the insights and special knowledge of a child's abilities
and needs which parents may impart. The wishes of the parents may be a factor to be considered in
making a special education placement decision, In re Madison Metropolitan School Dist., 1981-82
EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 503:125, :127 (Wis. SEA 1981), but will not be accepted as con-
trolling absent other evidence or expert testimony regarding the issue. Johnston v. Ann Arbor Pub.
Schools, 569 F. Supp. 1502, 1509 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (granting summary judgment to school district
when no genuine issue of material fact was presented since plaintiff offered only opinion of her
mother who is not an expert in field of special education); Frank v. Grover, 1982-83 EDUC. HANDI-
CAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 554:148 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1982) (expert testimony, including that of teacher,
relied upon to uphold school's IEP and refuse parents' request for different educational method).
The Act encourages parental involvement in a number of ways, including requiring parents to be
a part of the development of the IEP and allowing parents to file complaints challenging the educa-
tional program. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 182-83 n.6. The Comments to the EAHCA regulations make it
clear that the parents are to have an active role as "equal participants" in developing the child's
educational program. Comment, 34 C.F.R. § 300, app. C, at 65, 74 (1980). One court has seen the
involvement of the parents in all significant decisions made by the LEA as necessary to justify the
statutory deference accorded the state and local decisionmakers. Lang v. Braintree School Comm.,
545 F. Supp. 1221, 1223 n.3 (D. Mass. 1982). As another court has noted,
Although the procedure established for formulation of these IEPs requires parental input, there
is little doubt that the final decision rests with the local educational agency, a subdivision of the
state. This fact is reflected in . . .the statutory appeal procedure which grants a right only to
the parents to complain about the IEP, in contrast with the right to appeal decisions of the
hearing examiner, which is granted to both the state and to the parents.
Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 278 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981).
The placement of ultimate decisionmaking upon the state or local agency undoubtedly is based
upon the fact that the agency is in a better position to weigh and balance the competing interests of
all students within the system while parents' primary concern understandably will be the individual
child.
In weighing these interests, however, school systems may make policy and budgetary decisions
which unnecessarily limit the options available to the handicapped student before the parents ever
are involved in the decisionmaking process through development of the IEP. See Sindelar, How and
Why the Law Has Failed: An Historical Analysis of Services for the Retarded in North Carolina and a Prescription
for Change, LAw. & CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 1985, at 125. See also supra note 98 and accompanying
text. One commentator has, therefore, proposed training parents to participate in the bureaucratic
decisionmaking process. Sindelar, at 149-51. Such an undertaking should not only increase aware-
ness of the needs of the handicapped on the part of the school system and public at large, but should
also give parents of handicapped children greater insight into system-wide programs, priorities, and
budgetary constraints.
148. Application of Rowley, supra note 145, at SA-109.
149. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 196 (1983).
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must accept that decision if they desire federal funds."' 50
Even courts which have deferred to the LEA's choice of method have indi-
cated that they did so after noting that the requirements of the Act had been
met. For example, in Lang v. Braintree School Committee, '5 ' although the court
stated that it would not interfere with a state's choice as long as it was a "mini-
mally acceptable educational approach,"' 152 it also specifically stated that
"[i]nasmuch as the Braintree IEP relies on legitimate educational philosophy
akin to the mainstreaming approach preferred by the Act, and will provide
. . . what this court views as an education that benefits [the plaintiff] within
the meaning of the Act, the IEP must be deemed satisfactory under the
Act." 153 Decisions such as Lang indicate that courts are indeed attempting to
balance concern for the individual child's welfare as defined by the statute
against the principle of preserving local control over education decisions. 54
VI
SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT
The Poes also challenged the school system's refusal to offer a chronologi-
cally age-appropriate placement at the high school as a violation of section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973155 in that Clint and other high-school-
aged TMH students were being excluded from programs and services to
which they were entitled.
A. Requirement of Nondiscrimination
Section 504 is a broad requirement of nondiscrimination against the hand-
icapped in all federally assisted programs-including public schools. It
provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in sec-
tion 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 156
Regulations promulgated pursuant to section 504 add substance to its
requirements. 157 The regulations provide that a recipient of federal funds
may not:
150. Id. at 1062.
151. 545 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Mass. 1982).
152. Id. at 1227.
153. Id. at 1228; see also Silvio v. Commonwealth, 64 Pa. Commw. 192, 439 A.2d 893, 897-98
(1982) (court has no disposition to overturn conclusions of school district regarding "clash of philos-
ophies among experts" when conclusion is based upon ample evidence and is in keeping with least
restrictive environment requirement), afd, 500 Pa. 431, 456 A.2d 1366 (1983).
154. Comment, supra note 135, at 528.
155. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982)).
156. Id. It was undisputed, and the State Hearing Officer concluded, that Clint Poe is a qualified
handicapped person as defined in the statute and implementing regulations and that the Durham
County School System is a recipient of federal funds and therefore subject to the requirements of the
statute. Appellants' Brief at 40.
157. 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-104.61 (1984).
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- deny a handicapped person the opportunity to participate in or
benefit from an aid, service, or benefit provided by the local
program;
- deny equal opportunities to a handicapped person to participate in
or benefit from any aid, service, or benefit;
- provide an aid, service, or benefit to a handicapped person that is
not as effective as that provided to others;
- provide different or separate aids, benefits, or services to handi-
capped persons unless necessary to make the program as effective as
that offered to the nonhandicapped.158
As developed in part III of this comment, education involves more than
academics. Thus, the aids, benefits, and services which a school must provide
a student should include nonacademic elements of education because:
school resources include both human and material elements that can influence
achievement, social and cognitive development, and socialization. These resources
may be highly motivated peers, specific socialization processes, counselors, or aspects
of the curriculum and instructional program. By far the most important resource is
interaction with nonhandicapped peers who provide entry into the normal life exper-
iences of members of our society, such as going to dances, taking buses, shopping,
dating and wearing fashionable clothes. Most of these normal life experiences can be
obtained only within relationships with peers ....
Experience with a broad range of peers is not a superficial luxury to be enjoyed by
some students and not by others, but rather an absolute necessity for maximal
achievement and healthy cognitive and social development.' 59
Thus, by failing to provide access to age-appropriate activities and peers
and the benefits derived from such interaction, a school system precludes stu-
dents from obtaining "system benefits," or at least benefits that were as effec-
tive as those realized by the nonhandicapped students in the system who do
attend age appropriate schools. Such a practice may violate section 504.160
Part D of the section 504 regulations is directed at handicapped services
offered by elementary and secondary schools. These regulations essentially
parallel the substantive requirements of the EAHCA regulations, with some
differences which seem to favor age-appropriate placement even more
strongly. Relevant regulations include a requirement that a school system
provide a free appropriate education to all handicapped students within the
jurisdiction.' 6 1 School systems must develop programs which meet the indi-
vidual needs of handicapped students as adequately as the needs of nonhandi-
capped.' 62 And to direct placement decisions, the regulations require that
handicapped students be educated with nonhandicapped students "to the
maximum extent appropriate to the needs of the handicapped person,"
placing him in the "regular educational environment operated by the recip-
158. Id. § 104.4.
159. Johnson & Johnson, Integrating Handicapped Students into the Mainstream, 47 EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN 90 (1980).
160. New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 853 (10th Cir.
1982).
161. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (1984).
162. Id. § 104.33(b).
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ient unless it is demonstrated by the recipient" that education in that environ-
ment cannot be achieved satisfactorily, despite the provision of special
services.1 63 Under the regulations' mandate of the least restrictive educa-
tional environment, the student must be offered an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in nonacademic services such as physical education, athletics, and
extracurricular activities. ' 64
Note that this least restrictive environment requirement seems to be
broader than its parallel regulation under the EAHCA. Its preference is not
limited to regular classes but extends to the regular educational environment,
which presumably could apply to a school facility as well as to a class. The
burden is clearly placed upon the school system to show that the student's
needs require his removal from the regular environment.
In the Poe case, the school system argued that social skills develop sequen-
tially and that it would be inappropriate and perhaps harmful to place Clint at
the high school while he was still testing at a pre-adolescent social skills
level.' 65 The superintendent of the system testified, however, that the school
system had identified no specific social skill levels which all students must
master in order to move to the high school, 166 that the activities, situations,
and student behaviors at a high school were significantly different from those
encountered in a junior high,' 67 and that some nonhandicapped students
were placed in grade levels (at least through the tenth grade) based upon
subjective rather than academic considerations.168 Thus, Clint was as qualified
to attend the high school as these other students except for his handicap and
was therefore excluded solely by reason of his handicap. To cure this
problem, the system offered to place Clint at the high school in the EMH
program, which everyone agreed was inappropriate to his needs, but refused
to modify its existing program by providing a self-contained classroom for
TMH students at the high school. 169
B. Affirmative Modification
Although the Supreme Court has determined that the purpose of section
504 is to prohibit discrimination rather than to impose an affirmative action
obligation, 170 the Court has also noted that the distinction between discrimi-
nation and affirmative action not taken is rather unclear and has conceded
that in some situations refusal to modify an existing program might be dis-
criminatory under section 504.171 A number of courts have found a refusal to
163. Id. § 104.34(a).
164. Id. § 104.37.
165. Respondent's Brief at 5-6.
166. III Hearing Transcript at 38 (testimony of Dr. Yeager, Superintendent, Durham County
Schools).
167. Id. at 10.
168. Id. at 19.
169. Id. at 38-39; Petitioners' Brief at 2.
170. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1979).
171. Id. at 412-13.
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make affirmative modifications to be a violation of section 504.172 The courts
have also stated, however, that they will not find a refusal to modify an educa-
tional program discriminatory under section 504 if the handicapped student
could not realize the principal benefits of the program even after the accom-
modation was made since, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, "[S]ection
504 does not require 'substantial adjustments in existing programs beyond
those necessary to eliminate discrimination against otherwise qualified indi-
viduals.' "73 "Conversely, it is reasonable to conclude that refusal to accom-
modate a handicapped student in an educational program may constitute
discrimination if the student could thereby realize and enjoy the program's
benefits." 74
Even in situations where the student could benefit from a modified pro-
gram, the duty to modify is not unlimited. It is required only when it does not
impose undue financial or admininstrative hardships.' 75 Under this test, the
school must show that modifying an existing program would cause sufficient
hardship to justify its failure to take accommodating steps.' 76 Thus, all alter-
natives and costs and administrative problems should be examined. 77 The
Tenth Circuit has proposed a type of cost/benefit analysis, suggesting that
"the greater the number of children needing the particular special education
service, the more likely that failure to provide the service constitutes discrimi-
nation . . . because the more children in need of the service, the more the
benefits of that service outweigh its cost."' 78 In the Poe case, this type of
analysis would require taking into account all other high school aged TMH
students who might also benefit from a modification in the existing
program. 179
Although no cases were found which required a modification of existing
programs based upon an age-appropriate placement mandate, the Office of
Civil Rights did respond to a complaint from the Wake County (North Caro-
lina) School District alleging that the educational settings of older TMH stu-
172. See, e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1980) (failure to provide catheterization), on
remand, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981), affid, 703 F.2d 823 (Sth Cir. 1983), afd in part, revd in part
sub nom. Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984) (because school district was liable
to provide catheterization under EAHCA and § 504 is inapplicable when relief is available under
EAHCA to remedy a denial of educational services, respondents would not be entitled to relief under
§ 504); Camenisch v. Univ. of Texas, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980) (granting preliminary injunction
based upon likelihood of success on merits where university refused to provide interpreter for deaf
students), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); Lora v. Board of Educ., 456 F.
Supp. 1211 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (inadequate educational services in day schools for emotionally dis-
turbed children), afrd in part, vacated in part, 623 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1980).
173. Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d at 564 n.19 (quoting Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 410 (1979)).
174. New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 854 (10th Cir.
1982).
175. Id.
176. Lynch v. Maher, 507 F. Supp. 1268, 1280 (D. Conn. 1981).
177. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
178. New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 678 F.2d at 854 (considering possible statewide viola-
tions of section 504).
179. See supra notes 122-25 and accompanying text.
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dents were inappropriate because they were in schools where they had no
contact with students their own age. The Office of Civil Rights found this to
be a violation of the regulation mandating education in the least restrictive
environment. ' 8 0
VII
CONCLUSION
Handicapped students have been discriminated against and isolated from
the rest of society for centuries. The EAHCA and section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act are attempts to rectify this situation; handicapped students have
made tremendous gains within the public schools since their enactment. As
the broad goals of bringing students into the public schools have been met,
and hearing officers and judges begin to grapple with thorny questions "at the
fringe" of the statutes, they should do so by carefully interpreting the statutes
with an eye toward implementing their goals and purposes.
Chronologically appropriate placement is important to implement the goal
of integration of the handicapped. For, as one commentator noted,
The Supreme Court cases of Brown v. Board of Education and Wisconsin v. Yoder express
the idea that education. . . is the primary social learning mechanism of society. To be
deprived of an education is to be socially crippled; to be denied the opportunity to
education in a particular milieu is to be cut off and alienated from that milieu ....
[Children's] handicapped conditions, if Brown and Yoder are accepted, can only be
aggravated by the additional injury that the lack of appropriate social interaction with
the wider society causes. 1
8 1
Thus, age-appropriate placement should be a factor to be considered in a
placement decision under the EAHCA because it affords nonacademic sociali-
zation benefits which are part of an education. If a child's unique abilities and
needs as developed in his individual program show that he can function in an
age-appropriate environment and that he would obtain educational benefit
from such an environment, he should be placed in that setting to implement
both the goal of providing a free appropriate public education and of pro-
viding an education in the least restrictive environment. Such a requirement
does not infringe upon local autonomy in the field of public education since
180. Wake County (N.C.) School Dist., Ref: Complaint No. 04-83-1006, 3 [§ 504 Rulings]
EDUC. HANDICAPPED L. REP. (CRR) 257:432 (June 24, 1983).
No affirmative modification was required because the Wake County School District already had
plans to provide age-appropriate placements.
In the Poe case, the Hearing Officer specifically found that the Office of Civil Rights has ruled that
section 504 does not necessarily require that handicapped children of one age participate with non-
handicapped age mates. Conclusion of Law No. 2, Hearing Decision at 7. Evidently, this finding was
based upon an earlier conclusion of the Office of Civil Rights that an age inappropriate setting for a
severely retarded child did not violate section 504. In the earlier decision, however, it was deter-
mined that the child did not interact with other children or distinguish people or environments.
Thus, this situation is easily distinguishable from the Poe case since this child was evidently being
denied the benefits of interaction due to the severity of her handicap, and placement by the schools
made little difference. Petitioners' Brief at 10; Telephone Interview with Karen Sindelar, Attorney,
North Carolina Protection and Advocacy System (March 19, 1984).
181. Colley, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA): A Statutory and Legal Analysis, 10
J.L. & EDUC. 137, 139-40 (1981).
[Vol. 48: No. 2
Page 93: Spring 1985] AGE APPROPRIATENESS 123
the states have chosen to have their freedom of decisionmaking sharply cur-
tailed to the extent necessary to meet the basic requirements of the Act in
return for federal funds. Furthermore, refusing to allow equal participation
and benefit from educational programs, including nonacademic activities and
interaction with peers, to otherwise qualified handicapped individuals, consti-
tutes discrimination under section 504 and may, in some situations, require
rectification through affirmative modification of programs.
Evelyn M. Pursley

